

revenues recovered by the pipeline remain in balance with buyout and buydown costs covered by the filing and actually incurred by the pipeline.

(d) *Prudence.* (1) The Commission will examine the issue of prudence if it is raised by a party in an individual proceeding. If it is raised, the pipeline will be required to demonstrate the prudence of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs which it seeks to recover from its customers through both fixed and volume-based charges.

(2) The Commission intends to exercise its authority to the full extent permitted by the Natural Gas Act to approve take-or-pay settlements. The Commission intends to approve uncontested take-or-pay settlements which are consistent with this section and found to be in the public interest. The Commission will also, if it appears reasonable and permissible to do so, approve contested settlements as to all consenting parties and initiate separate hearings to establish the rates for opposing parties. Alternatively, the Commission will approve contested settlements on the merits if supported by substantial evidence in the record. In any case where hearings are held as to the prudence of take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs, the Commission will permit the pipeline the opportunity to recover all take-or-pay costs found to be prudent from the contesting parties on a proportional basis, even if the amount allowed is greater than the amounts initially sought to be recovered by the pipeline.

(e) *Flowthrough by downstream pipelines.* Downstream pipelines must flow through approved take-or-pay fixed charges based on the cumulative purchase deficiencies of their customers. Volumetrically-based surcharges must be flowed through on a volumetric basis. Customers of downstream pipelines have the right in connection with either PGA or general rate filings to challenge the purchasing practices of such pipelines. Remedies for purchasing practices found by the Commission to be imprudent will be determined on a case-by-case basis.

(f) *Ongoing proceedings.* Pipeline rate proceedings pending September 15, 1987 may be utilized as a forum for implementing the approved cost recovery

mechanisms set forth in this section. Permission will be granted in cases where implementation of this policy in pending proceedings appears feasible, will not result in inordinate delay, or can be expected to result in unnecessary or cumulative rate filings with the Commission. In the event permission is granted, the presiding judge(s) will allow pipelines to supplement their filings to the extent necessary to assure compliance with the filing and data requirements set forth herein. The presiding judges shall also establish any procedures necessary to protect the rights of all parties. Any rates established pursuant to this section will be permitted to become effective only prospectively upon Commission approval.

(g) *Scope.* This section does not go beyond the Commission's determination in the April 10, 1985, policy statement (Docket No. PL85-1-000) that take-or-pay buyout and buydown costs do not violate the pricing provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA). It is not intended to affect take-or-pay prepayments made by pipelines and included in account 165 and in their rate bases. Nor does it address the issue of whether take-or-pay prepayments to a producer for gas not taken and which cannot be made up violate the Title I pricing provisions of the NGPA. This policy statement applies only to buyout and buydown costs paid by pipelines that are transporting under part 284 of this chapter, under existing contracts, and is not intended to disturb in any way take-or-pay settlements previously entered into between pipelines and their producer suppliers.

[Order 500, 52 FR 30351, Aug. 14, 1987, as amended at 52 FR 35539, Sept. 22, 1987; Order 500-F, 53 FR 50924, Dec. 19, 1988; 54 FR 52394, Dec. 21, 1989; Order 581, 60 FR 53064, Oct. 11, 1995]

§ 2.105 Gas supply charges.

An interstate natural gas pipeline that transports under part 284 of this chapter may include in its tariff a charge, not related to facilities, for standing ready to supply gas to sales customers in accordance with the following principles:

§ 2.201

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(a) The pipeline may not recover take-or-pay or similar charges from suppliers by any other means.

(b) The pipeline must allow its sales customers to nominate levels of service freely within their firm sales entitlements or otherwise employ a mechanism for the renegotiation of levels of service at regular intervals.

(c) The pipeline must announce prior to nominations by the customers a firm price or pricing formula for the service, and hold that price or pricing formula firm during the interval arranged in paragraph (b) of this section.

(d) By nominating a new level of service lower than its current level, a customer has consented to any abandonment sought by the pipeline commensurate with the difference between the current level of service and the nominated level.

[Order 500, 52 FR 30352, Aug. 14, 1987; 52 FR 35539, Sept. 22, 1987, and 54 FR 52394, Dec. 21, 1989]

RULES OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY

§ 2.201 [Reserved]

STATEMENT OF GENERAL POLICY AND INTERPRETATIONS UNDER THE NATURAL GAS POLICY ACT OF 1978

§ 2.300 Statement of policy concerning allegations of fraud, abuse, or similar grounds under section 601(c) of the NGPA.

Recognizing the potential for an increasing number of intervenor complaints predicated on the fraud, abuse, or similar grounds exception to guaranteed passthrough, the Commission sets forth the elements of a cognizable claim under section 601(c)(2) which it expects to apply in cases in which fraud, abuse, or similar grounds is raised. The provisions of this policy statement do not establish a binding norm but instead provide general guidance. In particular cases, both the underlying validity of the policy and its application to particular facts may be challenged and are subject to further consideration. The procedure prescribed conforms with the NGPA's general guarantee of passthrough by placing the burden of pleading the elements and proving the elements of a case on intervenors who would allege fraud,

abuse, or similar grounds as a basis for denying passthrough of gas prices incurred by an interstate pipeline.

(a) In order for the issue of fraud, as that term is used in section 601(c) of the NGPA, to be considered in a proceeding, an intervenor or intervenors must file a complaint alleging that:

(1) The interstate pipeline, any first seller who sells natural gas to the interstate pipeline, or both acting together, have made a fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment; and

(2) Because of that fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment, the amount paid by the interstate pipeline to any first seller of natural gas was higher than it would have been absent the fraudulent conduct.

(b) In order for the issue of abuse, as that term is used in section 601(c) of the NGPA, to be considered in a proceeding, an intervenor or intervenors must file a complaint alleging that:

(1) The interstate pipeline, a first seller who sells to the interstate pipeline, or both acting together, have made a negligent misrepresentation or concealment, or other misrepresentation or concealment in disregard of a duty; and

(2) Because of that negligent misrepresentation or concealment, or other misrepresentation or concealment in disregard of a duty, the amount paid by the interstate pipeline to any first seller of natural gas was higher than it would have been absent the negligent misrepresentation or concealment, or other misrepresentation or concealment made in disregard of a duty.

(c) In order for the issue of similar grounds, as that term is used in section 601(c) of the NGPA, to be considered in a proceeding, an intervenor or intervenors must file a complaint alleging that:

(1) The interstate pipeline, any first seller who sells natural gas to the interstate pipeline, or both acting together, have made an innocent misrepresentation of fact; and

(2) Because of that innocent misrepresentation of facts, the amount paid by the interstate pipeline to any first seller of natural gas was higher